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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3790 
___________ 
 
KENNETH MURCHISON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP; UNKNOWN MEMBERS OF THE SORT TEAM;  
PHYSICIANS ASST. POTTER; DR. PIGOS; LT. SEBA; LT. SHERMAN;  
COUNSELOR  METZGER; EMT  MCCLINTOC 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-11-cv-02285) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 7, 2014 
Before:  CHAGARES, GARTH and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 8, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Kenneth Murchison, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania’s order dismissing 
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his complaint in part and granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants in part.  For 
the following reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. 
I. 
 In December 2011, Murchison filed a pro se civil complaint in the District Court.  
Murchison indicated in the caption of the complaint that he was bringing suit pursuant to 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  Murchison named a variety of individuals as defendants, including officials at 
United States Penitentiary Lewisburg, where he was an inmate.  In his complaint, 
Murchison alleged that during May 16-18, 2011, Defendants injured him through the use 
of excessive force, unlawful restraint, sexual assault, the denial of medical care, the 
denial of food and water, and torture.  Murchison sought injunctive relief and damages.   
 In January 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation, which 
the District Court adopted, dismissing with prejudice Murchison’s claims for money 
damages against Defendants in their official capacities, dismissing with prejudice claims 
against certain individuals, and dismissing without prejudice constitutional claims against 
the remaining defendants.  Murchison filed his first-amended complaint in April 2012.  
That complaint listed the remaining individual defendants and added as a defendant the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).  The complaint indicated in the caption that 
Murchison was bringing suit pursuant to Bivens.  The claims raised in the complaint 
related to the May 2011 incident, and Murchison indicated that all violations were 
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asserted under the Eighth Amendment.  However, Murchison referenced the “Tort Claim 
Act” and cited 28 U.S.C. § 501, which provides that the Department of Justice, of which 
the BOP is a part, is a U.S. executive department.  In June 2012, the Magistrate Judge 
filed a report and recommendation, which the District Court adopted in part and rejected 
in part.  As the Magistrate Judge recommended, the District Court ordered that the claims 
against the BOP be dismissed with prejudice because the BOP is not a proper defendant 
in a Bivens action.  The Magistrate Judge also found that it would be futile to allow 
Murchison to amend his pleading as to the BOP.  The District Court allowed Murchison’s 
claims against the remaining individual defendants to proceed. 
 After the filing of the June 2012 report and recommendation, but before the 
District Court partially adopted it, Murchison filed a second-amended complaint.  In that 
complaint, Murchison removed the BOP from the list of defendants.  In the caption, 
Murchison again indicated that he was bringing suit pursuant to Bivens, but he also 
indicated that he sought relief under the FTCA.  The complaint focused on the May 2011 
incident and included for the first time claims related to a similar allegation of excessive 
force and retaliation that occurred on June 17, 2012.  Murchison still sought injunctive 
relief and damages.  
 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment pursuant to 
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In an August 2013 report and 
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recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing any claim that 
Murchison attempted to raise under the FTCA because he did not name the United States 
as a defendant.  The Magistrate Judge also recommended granting summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants as to the Bivens claims, concluding that Murchison failed to exhaust 
his administrative remedies.  Over Murchison’s objections, which included a specific 
request for an opportunity to amend his complaint to add the United States as a 
defendant, the District Court adopted the report and recommendation, dismissed 
Murchison’s complaint as to his FTCA claims, and granted Defendants summary 
judgment as to the Bivens claims.  Murchison timely appealed.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review 
over both the District Court’s dismissal order and the order granting summary judgment.  
See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because the District Court’s dismissal order did not indicate 
whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, we treat it as an “adjudication on the 
merits.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Summary judgment is proper only when 
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the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
      III. 
 A. Bivens Claims 
 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits an inmate from bringing a 
civil rights suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison officials “until 
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  
This requirement applies to federal prisoners, like Murchison, seeking relief through a 
Bivens action.  See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 68-70 (3d Cir. 2000).  The record 
confirms that Murchison filed numerous requests for administrative remedies during the 
period between when he alleged his claims first arose and the filing of his complaint.  
However, none of the requests that Murchison properly submitted to the Central Office of 
the BOP, see 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a), addressed the claims raised in his complaint.
1
  
Accordingly, Murchison failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to the Bivens 
claims. 
                                              
1
 During the same time period, Murchison filed other administrative remedy requests 
with the Central Office, but they were rejected as improperly submitted.  While it is not 
clear from the record whether those requests pertained to the claims raised in the 
complaint, it is inconsequential because those rejected requests cannot be used to satisfy 
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); 
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing the PLRA’s procedural 
default component). 
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 B. FTCA Claims 
 The only proper defendant in a suit pursuant to the FTCA is the United States.  
See King v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 728 F.3d 410, 413 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013); CNA 
v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 138 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).  Insofar as Murchison attempted 
to raise FTCA claims in his second-amended complaint, he failed to do so because only 
individuals were named as defendants.  Accordingly, the District Court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over any claims raised under the FTCA and dismissal was appropriate.  
See Mars v. Hanberry, 752 F.2d 254, 255 (6th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he FTCA does not grant 
federal courts jurisdiction over actions against individual defendants such as federal 
employees.”). 
 In his objections to the August 2013 report and recommendation, Murchison stated 
that given the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that his complaint failed to state an FTCA 
claim, he should be allowed to “seek Leave to Amend His Complaint, and re-instate the 
United States as a Defendant.”  In a case such as this, where a plaintiff has already 
amended his complaint once as a matter of course, the plaintiff may amend only with 
leave of court or consent from the opposing party, but “leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).  The District Court did not address 
Murchison’s request and dismissed his FTCA claims.     
 Generally, we review the denial of a request for leave to amend for abuse of 
discretion, “and there is none where pleading deficiencies would not have been remedied 
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by proposed amendments.”  Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 2007).  
However, where, as here, the District Court did not determine whether leave to amend 
would have been futile our review is de novo.  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Dismissal without leave to amend is 
justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or futility.”  Alston v. 
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).  “[E]ven when a plaintiff does not seek leave to 
amend, if a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a District Court must permit a 
curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”  Id. at 235; 
see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).  Here, the District Court did 
not address Murchison’s request for leave to amend, and failed to either inform him that 
he had the opportunity to amend his complaint or determine that amendment would have 
been inequitable or futile.  Given these circumstances, we will remand in order that the 
District Court grant Murchison leave to amend, unless an amendment would be 
inequitable or futile.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for 
further proceedings.  Murchison’s motion for an extension of time to file a reply brief is 
granted. 
